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Abstract
Probabilistic counters are well known tools often used for space-efficient set cardinality
estimation. In this paper we investigate probabilistic counters from the perspective of
preserving privacy. We use standard, rigid differential privacy notion. The intuition is
that the probabilistic counters do not reveal too much information about individuals,
but provide only general information about the population. Thus they can be used
safely without violating privacy of individuals. It turned out however that providing a
precise, formal analysis of privacy parameters of probabilistic counters is surprisingly
difficult and needs advanced techniques and a very careful approach.
We demonstrate also that probabilistic counters can be used as a privacy protecion
mechanism without any extra randomization. That is, the inherit randomization from
the protocol is sufficient for protecting privacy, even if the probabilistic counter is used
many times. In particular we present a specific privacy-preserving data aggregation
protocol based on a probabilistic counter. Our results can be used for example in per-
forming distributed surveys.
Keywords: differential privacy, data aggregation, probabilistic counters
1. Introduction
Probabilistic counters are algorithms used for space-efficent representation of car-
dinality of some dynamically counted events. We would like to indicate occurence of
n events using very small (much less than log n) number of bits. We assume that n
is unknown in advance and may change. Clearly a simple information-theoretic argu-
ment convince us that is not feasible if we demand exact representation of the num-
ber of events. Nevertheless there are some very efficient solutions that require only
Θ(log log n) bits and guarantee sufficient accuracy for a wide range of applications.
Probabilistic counters are well known in the literature since the seminal Morris’ pa-
per [1] followed by its thorough mathematical analysis by Flajolet in [2]. They are
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used as building blocks in many space-efficent algorithms in the field of data mining,
network exploration or smart metering to mention a few.
In this paper we investigate probabilistic counters from the privacy-protection per-
spective. Our analysis is based on differential privacy notion commonly considered
as the only state-of-the-art approach. Differential privacy has the undeniable advan-
tage of being mathematically rigorous and formally provable in contrary to previous
anonymity-derived privacy definitions. This approach to privacy-preserving proto-
cols can be used to give formal guarantee for privacy resilient to any form of post-
processing. For survey about differential privacy properties see [3] and references
therein. Analysis of protocols based on differential privacy is usually technically much
more involved comparing with previous approaches, but by using it we are immune
against various attacks (see for example in [4, 5]).
Informally, the idea behind differential privacy is as follows: for two "neighbour-
ing" scenarios that differ only on participation of a single user, a differentially private
mechanism shall provide a response chosen from very similar distributions. In effect,
judging by the output of the mechanism one cannot say if a given individual was taken
into account for producing a given output. Intuitively, probabilistic counters should
provide high level of differential privacy, since statistically many various number of
events are "squeezed" into a small space of possible output results. Nevertheless, the
question about the exact parameters remains open. Moreover, there is a problem for
small values of n, when one can distinguish it from "neighbouring" cases with n − 1
and n + 1 with significant probability knowing the value of the counter. In our pa-
per we provide a very precise analysis of probabilistic counters from the perspective
of preserving privacy. It turned out that this task is surprisingly non-trivial from the
mathematical point of view.
Our primary motivation is to find possibly accurate privacy parameters of two most
fundamental probabilistic counter protocols, namely Morris Counter [1] and MaxGeo
Counter [6]. Note that the second one is used for yet another popular algorithm -
HyperLogLog [7]. We claim that a proved, high precision analysis in the case of prob-
abilistic counters is particularly important since even a mechanism with a very good
privacy parameters may cause a serious privacy breach when used multiple times (see
e.g. [3]). Clearly, probabilistic counters in realistic scenarios may be used many times
as a very fundamental primitive and a subroutine in more complex protocols.
We also show that they can be used safely without any additional randomization,
even in a very demanding settings. It is commonly known that no deterministic al-
gorithm can provide non-trivial differential privacy. Probabilistic counters, however,
possess inherent randomness, which can be utilized to achieve desired privacy param-
eters. In other words, one can say that probabilistic counters are safe by design and we
do not need any additional privacy oriented methods. In particular existing, working
implementations do not need to be changed if we start demanding a provable privacy
of a system.
Finally we demonstrate how our results can be used for constructing a data ag-
gregation protocol based on probabilistic counters that can be used in some specific
scenarios.
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1.1. Paper structure and results
The results of our paper are as follows:
• We prove that Morris Counter provides (L(n), 0.00033)-DP, where L(n) =
− ln (1− 16n ) ≈ 16n (Theorem 1 in Section 4). In Observation 1 we also show
that constant 16 cannot be improved.
• We prove that MaxGeo Counter provides (ε, δ)-DP if counter value is at least
n > ln(δ)
ln(1− 1
2lε
)
, where lε =
⌈
log
(
1 + 1ε
)⌉
(Theorem 5 in Section 4).
• We construct a privacy-preserving distributed survey protocol based on proba-
bilistic counters in Section 5.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Firstly, in Section 2 we recall differ-
ential privacy definition. In Section 3 we recall both Morris and MaxGeo counters and
propose a general definition for probabilistic counter (Definition 2). Moreover, we state
Fact 1 which is a useful reformulation of the standard differential privacy definition for
probabilistic counters. Our most important technical contribution is presented in Sec-
tion 4. We analyse how both counters behave under differential privacy regime. For the
sake of clarity some proofs are moved to the Appendix. In Section 5 we demonstrate
how probabilistic counter can be used for constructing a data aggregation protocol in
very particular, yet natural, scenario. In Section 6 we recall work related to our paper.
Finally, in Section 7 we present conclusions and future work propositions.
2. Differential Privacy Preliminaries
In this section we briefly recall differential privacy. For more details see for exam-
ple [3]. Note also, that we will denote the set of natural numbers by N and the set of all
integers by Z. Moreover, let N0 = N ∪ {0}. We assume that there exists a trusted cu-
rator who holds, or securely obtains, the data of individuals in a (possibly distributed)
database x. Let the number of rows be N . Every row consists of the data of some
individual. By X we denote the space of all possible rows. The goal is to protect the
data of every single individual, even if all users except one collude with the Adversary
to breach privacy of this single, uncorrupted user. On the other hand, the curator is re-
sponsible for producing a release – a possibly accurate response to a requested query.
This response is then released to the public, which is allowed to perform statistical
analysis on it. Differential privacy is by design resilient to post-processing attacks, so
even if the Adversary obtains the public release, he will not be able to infer anything
about specific individuals participating in that release.
A privacy mechanism is a randomized algorithm used by the curator that takes as
input a database, and produces the output (the release) using randomization.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy (formulation from [3])). A randomized algorithm
M with domain N|X | is (ε, δ)-differentially private, if for all S ⊆ Range(M) and for
all x, y ∈ N|X | such that ‖x− y‖1 6 1 the following condition is satisfied:
P (M(x) ∈ S) 6 exp(ε) · P (M(y) ∈ S) + δ,
where the probability space is over the outcomes of the mechanismM.
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An intuition of (ε, δ)-DP is as follows: if we choose two consecutive databases
(that differ exactly on one record), then the mechanism is very likely to return indis-
tinguishable values. In other words, it preserves privacy with high probability, but it is
admissible for mechanism to be out of control with negligible probability δ.
3. Probabilistic Counters
Throughout this paper we focus on probabilistic counters, denoted further by M .
It is a stochastic process that can be interpreted in terms of a mechanism, defined on a
space of all possible inputs.
Each increase of the data source which is being counted by the probabilistic counter
is called an incrementation request. Due to randomized nature of probabilistic counters
it may increase the value of the counter, but not necessarily. We will also denote the
incrementation request by ’1’. For generality, we also assume that the counter can get
as an input ’0’, and in such case it simply does nothing. This is useful for some real-life
scenarios, specifically data aggregation (see Section 5). Obviously only incrementation
requests are impacting the final result of the counter, hence we indicate the value of the
counter after n incrementation requests by Mn.
Note that in general, one can define probabilistic counter in the following way
Definition 2. We call stochastic process M a probabilistic counter if
Mn+1 = f(Mn, X(Mn))
whereMn is the value of the counter after n incrementation requests, X(Mn) is a ran-
dom variable, possibly dependent on Mn and f is an abritrary, nonnegative function.
Note that, using this definition, any probabilistic counter can be described with a tuple
{M0, (f(·, ·), X(Mn))}.
In the Figure 1 one can see graphical representation of probabilistic counter. By 1
we denote the incrementation request and 0 denotes ’0’ input, therefore no incremen-
tation request. The dice denotes the randomness (namely X(Mn)) from Definition 2.
Figure 1: Graphical depiction of probabilistic counter.
We emphasize that the probabilistic counter depends on the number of incrementa-
tion requests. We would like to show that if we reveal the final result it will not expose
any sensitive data about any single record. Moreover, note that if x and y differs only
by one ’0’ input, then P (M(x) ∈ S) = P (Mn ∈ S) = P (M(y) ∈ S), where n is the
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number of incrementation requests both in x and y. See that then the condition in Defi-
nition 1 is trivially fulfilled. Hence for our convenience, when describing probabilistic
counters in terms of differential privacy, we use to mark only the number of incremen-
tation requests provided by individuals which we denote by Mn for n incrementation
requests. We present the following
Fact 1. Let M be a probabilistic counter which takes values from a discrete set A.
Moreover assume that there exists such S ⊂ A that for all n,m > 1 such that |n−m| 6
1 and for all s ∈ S
P (Mn = s) 6 exp(ε) · P (Mm = s) (1)
and
P (Mn /∈ S) 6 δ . (2)
Then M is (ε, δ)-DP.
Note that, for our setting, this is fully compatible with the regular differential privacy
(Definition 1).
3.1. Morris Counter
We begin with a short description of Morris Counter (originally refered as an ap-
proximate counter [1, 2]). Let us fix a > 1. Algorithm 1 is a very simple pseudocode
of Morris Counter [1].
1 M ← 1;
2 while receive request do
3 generate r ∼ Uni([0, 1]);
4 if r < a−M then
5 M ←M + 1;
Algorithm 1: Morris Counter Algorithm
Roughly speaking, we start with M = 1. Each incoming incrementation request
triggers a random event. This event increments the counter (M ← M + 1) with prob-
ability 1
aM
. Note that this approximate counting protocol can be easily distributed.
Indeed, any entity who wants to increment the counter, only has to send the request
to increment it and these requests will be queued on the server and resolved one af-
ter another. A detailed description of the approximate counting method can be found
in [1, 2]. Throughout this article we examine only a standard Morris Counter, i.e. with
a = 2.
Fact 2. Morris Counter can be represented by the general counter from Definition 2
for M0 = 1, X(Mn) ∼ B
(
1
2Mn
)
, f(x, y) = x+ y.
Morris Counter can be also defined recursively in the following way
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Definition 3. Morris Counter is a Markov process (Mn, n ∈ N0) which satisfies:
P (M0 = 1) = 1 ,
P (Mn+1 = l|Mn = l) = 1− 2−l ,
P (Mn+1 = l + 1|Mn = l) = 2−l ,
for any l ∈ N and n ∈ N0.
Note that Definition 3 can be derived directly from a run of Algorithm 1. From now on
let P (Mn = l) = pn,l. Directly from Definition 3 we attain the following functional
recursion:
pn+1,l = (1− 2−l)pn,l + 2−l+1pn,l−1 (3)
for l ∈ N and n ∈ N0 with starting and boundary conditions p0,1 = 1, p0,l = 0 for
l > 2 and pn,0 = 0 for n ∈ N0.
Accuracy versus Differential Privacy. The accuracy of Morris Counter has been thor-
oughly analysed in various classical papers. First detailed analysis was proposed by
Philippe Flajolet in [2]. Here we present an essence of theorems presented in [2], that
occur to get a foothold in the considerations of this Morris Counter in terms of Differ-
ential Privacy:
Fact 3. Let Mn denote Morris Counter after n successive incrementation requests.
Then this random variable has an expected value E (Mn) ≈ log(n)− 0.273225 and a
variance Var(Mn) ≈ 0.763177.
See that Fact 3 guarantees good accuracy of Morris Counter and also a concentration of
Mn around its average — a characteristic desirable in order to establish the differential
privacy feature. For a, b ∈ Z let us define a discrete interval [a, b] ∩ Z by [a : b]. This
motivation justifies a definition of moving intervals:
In = [max{1, dlog(n)e − 4} : min{n+ 1, dlog(n)e+ 4}] ,
which will emerge as a crucial point of our further considerations of this Markov pro-
cess in terms of DP in Section 4.
3.2. MaxGeo Counter
We begin with a short description of MaxGeo counter. Algorithm 2 shows its pseu-
docode. Speaking informally, for each incrementation request the server has to gen-
erate a random variable from Geo( 12 ) distribution. Final result is the maximum taken
over all these generated random variables.
Fact 4. MaxGeo counter can be represented by the general counter from Definition 2
for M0 = 0, X(Mn) ∼ Geo( 12 ) and f(x, y) = max(x, y).
The expectation and variance of a maximum of n i.i.d. geometric variables have al-
ready been analysed in the literature, and it turns out they have satisfying concentration
properties (see [6]).
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1 C ← ∅;
2 while receive request do
3 generate r ∼ Geo( 1
2
);
4 add r to C;
5 return max(C);
Algorithm 2: MaxGeo Counter Algorithm
3.3. HyperLogLog
The maximum of geometric variables is used as a primitive in well known Hyper-
LogLog algorithm (see [7]), therefore its privacy properties are important both from
theoretical and practical point of view. See that essentially in HyperLogLog we have
k independent MaxGeo counters M [1], . . . ,M [k] and for each incrementation request
we choose one of the counters uniformly at random. Let us denote the chosen counter
byM [j]. Then we generate random variable withX ∼ Geo( 12 ) distribution and update
M [j] := max(M [j], X). The final estimation is
HyperLogLog := αkk
2
 k∑
j=1
1
2M [j]
−1 ,
where αk is a constant dependent only on k ([7]).
4. Probabilistic Counters Privacy Properties
4.1. Morris Counter Privacy
In this subsection we investigate Morris Counter in terms of (ε, δ)-DP in order to
obtain beneath
Theorem 1. Let M denote the Morris Counter and assume |n−m| 6 1. Then
P (Mn = l) 6
(
1− 16
n
)−1
· P (Mm = l) + δ,
where δ < 0.00033, so M is (L(n), 0.00033)-DP with
L(n) = − ln
(
1− 16
n
)
=
16
n
+
128
n2
+O(n−3) 6 16
n− 8 .
To do so, we take the following steps. First we consider a concentration of Morris
Counter in the vicinity of its mean value. More precisely, we show that Morris Counter
after n incrementation requests takes values in relatively small intervals In with proba-
bility 1− δ (then Mn satisfies the condition (2) for S(n) = In), where δ is some small
constant arised from the proof. Note that In may be interpreted as confidence intervals
at level 1 − δ (see e.g. [8]). Afterwards, we provide some lemmas which enable us
to establish a curtailment of ε(n) parameter in formula (1) in interval In for n > 27.
Finally we obtain analogous results for smaller number of incrementation requests n.
A foregoing Theorem, provided by Flajolet, comes to the fore in an accomplish-
ment of those goals:
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Theorem 2 (Proposition 1 from [2]). The probability pn,l that the Morris Counter
has value l after n incrementation requests is
pn,l =
l−1∑
j=0
(−1)j 2−j(j−1)/2
(
1− 2−(l−j)
)n j∏
i=1
(
1− 2−i)−1 l−1−j∏
i=1
(
1− 2−i)−1 .
Notice that Theorem 2 presents an explicit formula for P (Mn = l), which (as we
may experience in Appendix A) is not handful to analyze. However it is yet simple
enough to find the values numerically (also note that recursive Definition 3 provides
those probabilities as well, but this approach is not efficient in terms of memory and
time for big number of requests n). We avail ourselves of Theorem 2 in all technical
proofs of lemmas in Appendix A.
Let us commence with a few facts about the concentration of the distribution of the
random variable Mn:
Lemma 1. Let Mn be the state of the Morris Counter after n incrementation requests.
Then
δ1 := P (Mn 6 dlog(n)e − 5) 6 0.000006515315 . . . .
Lemma 2. Let Mn be the state of the Morris Counter after n incrementation requests.
Then
δ2 := P (Mn > dlog(n)e+ 5) 6 0.000325521 . . . .
The proofs of both lemmas 1 and 2 are presented in Appendix A.
Theorem 3. The state of the Morris Counter after n incrementation requests is not in
a set In with probability δ < 0.00033.
PROOF. Realize that P (Mn ∈ [1 : n+ 1]) = 1. This observation, together with lem-
mas 1 and 2 bears a conclusion that
δ := P (Mn /∈ In) = δ1 + δ2 < 0.00033 .

In the second part, we try to establish ε(n) parameter of DP of Mn. It remains to
examine the property (1) in the interval In. Therefore, we are interested in finding an
upper bound for maximal privacy loss for any n ∈ N and k ∈ In:
ε(n) = max
{∣∣∣∣ln(pn±1,kpn,k
)∣∣∣∣ : k ∈ In} . (4)
Actually, we may consider + sign instead of ± in (4), because | ln(x)| = | ln( 1x )|.
However, when In 6= In±1, we have to behave carefully, so in particular, an additional
check of privacy loss with − sign is needed when n is of a form 2l + 1 for some l ∈ N.
Claim 1. For k > 7, we have p2k+1,k+4 6 27p2k+1,k+5.
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The above claim is a result of a simple application of Lemma 6 from Appendix A.
Claim 2. If for any given n, there exists an ascending and positive sequence (αi)ni=1
such that (∀ i ∈ [1 : n]) pn,i = 2iαipn,i+1, then there also exists an ascending and
positive sequence (α′i)
n+1
i=1 such that
(∀ i ∈ [1 : n+ 1]) (pn+1,i = 2iα′ipn+1,i+1) ∧ (∀ i ∈ [1 : n]) (α′i < αi) .
This claim emerges from lemmas 7 and 8 from Appendix A. We use Claim 2 to guar-
antee starting conditions for the next Lemma 3. Hence we would like to gather some
information about the distribution of M27+1. More precisely we are interested in a
behaviour of θi =
p129,i
p129,i+1
for i 6 11 (presented in the Table 1). In the Table 1 we
i θi 2i−4 24−iθi
1 9.6205 . . . · 10−24 0.125 7.6964 . . . · 10−23
2 1.73351 . . . · 10−9 0.25 6.93402 . . . · 10−9
3 0.000119359 . . . 0.5 0.000238718 . . .
4 0.0140238 . . . 1 0.0140238 . . .
5 0.158163 . . . 2 0.0790814 . . .
6 0.771817 . . . 4 0.192954 . . .
7 2.67702 . . . 8 0.334628 . . .
8 7.83367 . . . 16 0.489604 . . .
9 20.8095 . . . 32 0.650297 . . .
10 52.0472 . . . 64 0.813238 . . .
11 125.065 . . . 128 0.977073 . . .
Table 1: Ratios of adjacent probabilities of a distribution of M27+1, compared with exponential function of
a base 2.
roughly see a superexponential trend of proportions θi, so we are able to use Claim 2
for n > 27 + 1. It might seem that the choice of n is arbitrary, but it occurs that a
distribution of M26+1 does not have necessary properties of privacy loss.
Lemma 3. Let l ∈ N and n = 2l−1. If pn+1,l+c−1 6 2c+3pn+1,l+c for every c in an
interval [−l + 1 : 4], then
(∀ N > n+ 1)(∀ c ∈ [−l + 1 : 4]) pN,l+c−1 < 2c+3pN,l+c .
PROOF. Realize that for c = −l + 1, the demanded inequality is trivial. Therefore
we can safely consider c ∈ [−l + 2 : 4] and any N > n + 1 with an assumption that
pN,l+d−1 < 2d+3pN,l+d for d ∈ {c− 1, c}. Then
pN+1,l+c−1
(3)
= pN,l+c−1(1− 2−l−c+1) + pN,l+c−22−l−c+2
6 23+cpN,l+c(1− 2−l−c+1) + 23+(c−1)pN,l+c−12−l−c+2
< 23+c(pN,l+c(1− 2−l+c) + 2−l−c+1pN,l+c−1) = 23+cpN+1,l+c .
The thesis is an upshot of an appropriate application of inductions. 
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Claims 1 and 2, together with Table 1 enable us to apply Lemma 3 for n = 2k + 1
for any k > 7.
Theorem 4. Let n > 27 = 128 and k ∈ In. Then
1− 16
n
6 pn±1,k
pn,k
6 1 + 16
n
.
PROOF. According, to the previous discussion about formula (4), we examine:
pn+1,k
pn,k
(3)
=
pn,k(1− 2−k) + 2−k+1pn,k−1
pn,k
= 1 + 2−k
(
−1 + 2pn,k−1
pn,k
)
.
Let l = dlog(n)e and c = k − l ∈ [−4 : 4]. Then Lemma 3 bears pn,k−1pn,k 6 2c+3, so
pn+1,k
pn,k
6 1 + 2−l−c(−1 + 2c+4) < 1 + 2−l+4 = 1 + 16
2dlog(n)e
< 1 +
16
n
.
If n = 2l−1 + 1 for some l ∈ N, then a little adjustment is neccesary. Indeed, let
now c − 1 = k − l ∈ [−4 : 4], and once again, Lemma 3 provides pn−1,k−1pn−1,k < 2c+2.
However, it still holds that:
pn,k
pn−1,k
= 1 + 2−k
(
−1 + 2pn−1,k−1
pn−1,k
)
6 1 + 2−l−c+1
(−1 + 2c+3) < 1 + 16
n
.
On the other hand, we obviously have pn+1,kpn,k > 1− 2−l−c and
pn,k
pn−1,k
> 1− 2−l−c for
any c ∈ [−4 : 4], so both of these fractions exceed 1− 16n . 
Theorem 4 only provides ε(n) 6 − ln (1− 16n ) for n > 128 (compare with (4)).
However, in the Figure 2 we may briefly see that the above inequality is true for smaller
number of requests n as well.
Having all the technical lemmas, we are now ready to prove Theorem 1.
PROOF. Suppose that S(n) = In in Fact 1. Then from theorems 3 and 4 we can easily
see that P (M(x) /∈ S(n)) < 0.00033 and
(∀ l ∈ S(n)) P (M(x) = l) 6
(
1− 16
n
)−1
· P (M(y) = l) ,
hence from Fact 1 we obtain the main result. 
In the Figure 2 we may perceive that values of ε(n) are strictly between− ln(1− 8n )
and − ln(1 − 16n ) for n ∈ [17 : 160]. We can also observe that ε(n) ≈ 24−dlog(n)e in
this interval. Remark that dlog(n)e 6 4 for n 6 16, so dlog(n)e − 4 < 1, but M is
always positive. This can be discerned as a reason of chaotic behaviour of the process
for n 6 16. Nevertheless, Figure 2 affirms the quality of ε(n) parameter established in
Theorem 1. Moreover, we present the following
Observation 1. The constant 16 in Theorem 1 cannot be improved. See that
p33,1
p32,1
=
1
2 = 1− 1632 .
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Figure 2: Exact values of ε(n) parameter for n 6 160 compared with plots of sequences− ln(1− 16
n
) and
− ln(1− 8
n
).
4.2. MaxGeo Counter Privacy
In this subsection we present a theorem which shows the privacy guarantees of
the MaxGeo Counter. Assume that we have n incrementation requests. In case of
MaxGeo Counter, it means that the we generate random variables X1, . . . , Xn, where
Xi ∼ Geo( 12 ) are pairwise independent. Ultimately the result of the counter is the
maximum over all Xi’s, namely X = max(X1, . . . , Xn). We present the following
Theorem 5. LetM denote the MaxGeo counter and n denote the number of incremen-
tation requests. Consider m such that |n − m| 6 1. Fix ε > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1) and
let
lε =
⌈
log
(
1 +
1
ε
)⌉
.
If
n > ln(δ)
ln
(
1− 1
2lε
) , (5)
then
P (Mn ∈ S) 6 eε · P (Mm ∈ S) + δ,
so M is (ε, δ)-DP.
PROOF. We have n incrementation requests for MaxGeo counter M , which means
that the result of the mechanism is X = max(X1, . . . , Xn), where Xi ∼ Geo( 12 ) are
pairwise independent. First we observe that if n = m then the counter trivially satisfies
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differential privacy, as the probability distribution of X does not change at all. From
now on we assume that |n−m| = 1. See that
P (X 6 l) =
n∏
i=1
P (Xi 6 l) = (P (X1 6 l))n =
(
1− 1
2l
)n
=
(
2l − 1
2l
)n
.
Furthermore
P (max(X1, . . . , Xn) = l) = P (X = l) = P (X 6 l)− P (X 6 (l − 1)) =
=
(
2l − 1
2l
)n
−
(
2l−1 − 1
2l−1
)n
=
(
2l − 1)n − (2l − 2)n
2l·n
.
Now we need to calculate the following expression
P (max(X1, ...Xn) = l)
P (max(X1, ...Xn, Xn+1) = l)
=
(
2l − 1)n − (2l − 2)n
2l·n(
2l − 1)n+1 − (2l − 2)n+1
2l·(n+1)
=
=
((
2l − 1)n − (2l − 2)n) · 2l
(2l − 1)n+1 − (2l − 2)n+1
=
=
2l
2l − 1 ·
((
2l − 1)n − (2l − 2)n)(
(2l − 1)n − (2l−2)n+1
2l−1
) 6
6 2
l
2l − 1 ·
((
2l − 1)n − (2l − 2)n)(
(2l − 1)n − (2l−2)n+1
2l−2
) =
=
2l
2l − 1 = 1 +
1
2l − 1 .
For fixed ε value we need to satisfy the following inequality∣∣∣∣ln( P (max(X1, ...Xn) = l)P (max(X1, ...Xn, Xn+1) = l)
)∣∣∣∣ 6 ε ,
which gives the following
ln
(
1 +
1
2l − 1
)
6 1
2l − 1 6 ε . (6)
From (6) we can see that the greater l is, the smaller ε can be. Moreover, inequality (6)
is true for l > lε. Therefore, we have to assure that P (X 6 lε) 6 δ. See that
P (X 6 lε) =
(
1− 1
2lε
)n
.
It is easy to see that the above decreases when n increases. Then(
1− 1
2lε
)n
6 δ ⇐⇒ n > ln(δ)
ln(1− 1
2lε
)
.

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Ultimately it means that for fixed privacy parameters (ε, δ) we can calculate the
minimum number of incrementation requests that is necessary to satisfy given privacy
parameters. This can be done by artificially adding them before actually collecting
data. Of course it would have to be taken into account during calculating the actual
estimation of number of counts and it can have an impact on the precision of the esti-
mations. See that if we can perform such a preprocessing, then for every (ε, δ) we can
easily know how many artificial counts have to be added.
Note that from differential privacy perspective, HyperLogLog is an arbitrary post-
processing performed on k MaxGeo counters. Moreover, as each response goes to
one counter only, they are independent from each other, which means that we can use
parallel composition theorem (see [3]). This gives us the following
Observation 2. Assume we have k MaxGeo countersM [1], . . . ,M [k], which are used
in HyperLogLog algorithm. If jth MaxGeo counter is (εj , δj)-DP then HyperLogLog
is (max
i
εi,max
i
δi)-DP.
4.3. Comparison of Morris and MaxGeo Counters Privacy Properties
In this subsection we show comparison for both counters privacy properties. See
that for fixed δ and n we may obtain from Theorem 5 that
ε(n) >
(
2
⌊
− log
(
1−δ 1n
)⌋
− 1
)−1
. (7)
From now on, we may assume that ε(n) is exactly the right hand side of (7). In order
to limit it we may consider:
ψ(n, δ) :=
((
1− δ 1n
)−1
− 1
)−1
= − ln(δ)
n
+
ln(δ)2
2n2
− ln(δ)
3
6n3
+O(n−4) , (8)
so ε(n) > ψ(n, δ) = − ln(δ)n + O(n−2). We would like to find out whether ε(n +
1) 6= ε(n) to establish an upper bound for this parameter. Consider a situation when
ε(m − 1) 6= ε(m). We search for a minimal n such that ε(n) = ε(m − 1). Then
− log
(
1− δ 1m
)
> − log
(
1− δ 1n
)
+ 1, so τ(m, δ) := (1− δ 1m )−1 > 2(1− δ 1n )−1.
Assume that τ(n0(n, δ)) = 2τ(n, δ). Remark that n0(n, δ) can be derived precisely
using W-Lambert special function (see [9] for a definition and properties), however the
exact form of n0(n, δ) is redundant in order to attain
ε(n) 6 φ(n, δ) := ψ(n0(n, δ), δ) = −2 ln(δ)
n
+
3 ln(δ)2
n2
− 13 ln(δ)
2
3n3
+O(n−4) .
Hence, in case of δ = 0.00033, we attain
8.0164 . . .
n
+
32.13147 . . .
n2
+O(n−3) 6 ε(n) 6 16.0328 . . .
n
+
192.789 . . .
n2
+O(n−3) .
On the other hand from Theorem 1, we know that when δ = 0.00033, then Morris
Counter (defined by (4)) has
ε(n) 6 − ln
(
1− 16
n
)
=
16
n
+
128
n2
+O(n−3) .
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This shows that both Morris Counter and MaxGeo Counter behave quite similarly un-
der comparable conditions and Figure 3 confirms this relation.
Figure 3: Values of ε(n) parameters for Morris and MaxGeo Counters compared with boundaries for ε(n)
for MaxGeo Counter: the lower one — ψ(n, δ) and the upper one — φ(n, δ) (n 6 160 and δ = 0.00033).
Realize that the above conclusions remain true if δ(n) is not constant. This short
observation enable us to obtain a more general result:
Example 1. Let δ(n) = 1nc for some constant c > 0. Then
ε(n) 6 φ(n, δ(n)) = 2c ln(n)
n
+
3c2 ln(n)2
n2
+O
(
c3 ln(n)3
n3
)
and MaxGeo Counter is (φ(n, δ(n)), δ(n))-DP for any n ∈ N. Both sequences of
parameters tends to 0, which may be used as an advantage when an expected number
of incrementation requests D is very large. However, we emphasize that this requires
δ(n) to be negligible.
5. Privacy-Preserving Survey via Probabilistic Counters
In this section we present an example scenario for data aggregation using proba-
bilistic counters. We assume there is a server (alternatively we call it aggregator) and
a collection of nodes (e.g. mobile phone users) and we want to perform a boolean
survey with a sensitive question. Namely, each user sends ’0’ if his/her answer is no
and ’1’ if the answer is yes. We assume that the connections between users and the
server are perfectly secure and the data can safely get to the trusted server. This can be
performed using standard cryptography solutions. The goal of the server is to publish
14
the sum of all ’1’ responses in a privacy-preserving way. Such goal could obviously
be achieved by simply collecting all the data and adding an, appropriately calibrated,
Laplace noise (see [3]), but we aim to show that probabilistic counters have inherently
sufficient randomness to be differentially private, without any auxilliary randomizing
mechanism.
We can present the general scenario in the following way:
1. each user sends his/her bit of data to the server using secure channels,
2. server plugs the data points sequentially into the counter,
3. if the data point is ’1’, the counter receives incrementation request, otherwise,
the data is ignored,
4. each incrementation request is being processed by the counter and may lead
(depending on randomness) to an increase of the value of the counter,
5. after all data is processed, the value of the counter is released to the public.
Note that we assume that the Adversary has access only to the released value. See
also that we released just the counter value itself, which is not actually an estimation
of ’1’ responses. Such estimation is a function of released value, which is different
for Morris or MaxGeo Counter and there also can be various ways to estimate the
actual number using counter value. However, this does not really matter for our case,
as differential privacy is, conveniently, fully resilient to post-processing (see [3]). The
graphical depiction of our considered scenario is presented in the Figure 4.
Figure 4: Scenario for data aggregation using probabilistic counters. We assume that the Adversary does not
have any way to extract information from within the rectangle.
Adversary. Our assumptions about the Adversary are the same as in most differential
privacy papers. Namely, he may collude with any subset of the participants (e.g. all
except the single user whose privacy he wants to breach). On the other hand, the
aggregator is trusted. See that even though we have a distributed system in mind,
this is, in fact, a central differential privacy scenario. We do not assume pan-privacy.
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It means that the internal state of the algorithm is not subject to the constraints of
differential privacy. Obviously if the adversary would know the internal state of the
counter at any time or could observe whether after receiving data from specific user the
server has to perform computations to potentially increment the counter (implying a ’1’
response) or not, he would easily violate the privacy. We also do not assume privacy
under continual observation, the survey is not published iteratively, but one time only,
after it is finished. To sum it up, the Adversary cannot
• extract or tamper with the internal state of the counter,
• extract any information from the server or channels between users and server.
The Adversary can
• collude with any subset C of the participants (e.g. know their data or make them
all send ’0’ to the server) in order to breach privacy of user not belonging to C,
• obtain the final result of the aggregation and perform any desired post-processing
on it.
Note that, in light of our theorems 1 and 5 both Morris Counter and MaxGeo Counter
preserve differential privacy in such scenario. Assume we have at least n users holding
’1’, therefore at least n incrementation requests. See that we can either know it based
on domain knowledge (e.g. we expect that at least some fraction of users will send ’1’
based on similar surveys) or add artificial n counts to the counter initially. Obviously,
in case of artificial counts it has to be taken into account when estimating the final sum.
Using Morris Counter we obtain (L(n), 0.00033)-DP with L(n) = − ln (1− 16n ) 6
16
n−8 . We present the following
Example 2. Assume we have at least n = 200 incrementation requests. After using
Theorem 1, we have L(n) 6 16n−8 6 0.08334. Therefore, using Morris Counter, the
survey presented above is (0.08334, 00033)-DP.
On the other hand, using MaxGeo Counter for given ε and δ we get (ε, δ)-DP as long
as n > ln(δ)
ln(1− 1
2lε
)
, where lε =
⌈
log
(
1 + 1ε
)⌉
. Here we present an example.
Example 3. Let ε = 0.5 and δ =
1
D2
, where D is the the number of all survey
participants. After using our theorem and straightforward calculations we have
n > 7 ln(D) .
Say we will have e20 participants. Then if we have at least 140 incrementation requests,
we satisfy (0.5, 1D2 )-DP.
6. Previous and Related Work
In our paper we take a different perspective on probabilistic counters. Namely,
we focus on their inherent privacy guarantees in the sense of differential privacy. The
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idea of differential privacy has been introduced for the first time in [10], however its
precise formulation in the widely used form appeared in [11]. There is a long list of
papers concerning differential privacy, e.g. [12, 13, 14]. Most of these papers focus
on a centralised model, namely a database with trusted party holding it. See that in
our paper, despite the distributed setting, we have the same trust model. There is a
party called curator that is entitled to gather and see all participants’ data in the clear
and releases the computed data to wider (possibly untrusted) audience. Comprehensive
information concerning differential privacy can be found in [3].
The idea of probabilistic counters, along with the well known Morris Counter was
presented in the seminal paper [1]. Very detailed analysis by Flajolet can be found
in [2]. MaxGeo Counter was first proposed and analysed in [6]. More detailed and pre-
cise analysis can be found in [15]. Most important application of MaxGeo Counter can
be found in [7], where the authors propose the well-known HyperLogLog algorithm.
It’s practical applications are widely described in [16].
Probabilistic counters were previously considered in terms of privacy preservation
for set cardinality estimators. The authors of [17] show that in the scenario of using
probabilistic counters for set cardinality estimation with the Adversary being able to
extract the intermediate values of counter, the privacy is not preserved. Note that, in
this paper we perform data aggregation instead of cardinality estimation, moreover we
assume the Adversary is not able to extract any intermediate values from the counter.
To the best of authors knowledge, probabilistic counters has not been considered for
data aggregation under differential privacy regime before.
Unsurprisingly one of the main applications of probabilistic counter is to compute
a size of a database or its extraordinary subset. A set of such applications can be
found in [18]. In [19] the authors use Morris Counter for online, probabilistic and
space efficient counting over streams of fixed, finite length. Authors of [20] proposed
an application of a system of Morris Counters for flash memory devices. Another
application, presented in [21], is a revisited version of Morris Counter designed for
binary floating-point numbers. In [22] Morris Counter is used in a well-known problem
of counting the frequency moments of long data streams. The authors of [23] focused
on making probabilistic counters scalable and accurate in concurrent setting. Paper on
probabilistic counters in hardware can be found in [24].
In random graphs theory, Morris Counter is usually connected to greedy structures.
For instance, in an arragement of a random labeled graph in Gilbert model G(n, p), it
is possible to construct a greedy stable set Sn, which size has the same distribution as
Morris Counter Mn of the base a = (1− p)−1 (see e.g. [25] or [26] for fundamentals
of random graph theory).
There are many other birth processes that are quite similar to Morris Counter, which
are applicable in variety of disciplines like biology, physics or theory of random graphs.
Short descriptions of such examples can be found in [27].
7. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we have investigated probabilistic counters from privacy-protection
perspective. We have shown that both Morris Counter and MaxGeo Counter have suf-
ficient differential privacy guarantees inherently from the mechanism itself, provided
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that there is at least a small number incrementation requests. Otherwise the counter
has too low value and, intuitively, the result is not randomized enough. We have also
shown, that constant in our Morris Counter result cannot be improved further.
We have shown how to perform data aggregation, namely a distributed survey, in
a privacy-preserving manner by using probabilistic counters. Note that the security
model in this paper was somewhat optimistic. Unfortunately, in such setting there is
little incentive to using them, other than the situation when we already have them de-
ployed and working as aggregators. This would, however, change tremendously were
we able to weaken these assumptions.This seems a very promising way to continue
our research from this paper. Namely, we focused on privacy here, and are still miss-
ing the ability to weaken the security assumptions and allow the Adversary to extract
information from channels between users and the aggregator. That would put us in
the, so called, Local Model, where each user is responsible for the data randomization.
However, such approach require us to be able to perform probabilistic counter in an
oblivious manner which, to the best of our knowledge, was not explored before.
In Subsection 3.1 we have mentioned about the generalization of Morris Counter
(for bases a > 1). Analysis of privacy properties of such variants of Morris Counters
and various probabilistic counters presented for example in [21], [28] may also be
promising direction of further research.
Appendix A. Technical Lemmas and Proofs Related to Differential Privacy of
Morris Counter
For the sake of completeness, we present here proofs of all technical lemmas that
are not directly connected to Theorem 1. Some of computations are supported by
Wolfram Mathematica ver.11.3 ([29]). Whenever we obtain a result in this manner, we
indicate it by W= sign. Usually results are precise, however in some cases, final forms
are attained numerically.
Let us commence with several definitions used throughout this appendix.
An increasing sequence
k∏
i=1
(
1− 2−i)−1 that arised in Theorem 2 will be indicated by
rk and we denote its limit
∞∏
i=1
(
1− 2−i)−1 W= 3.46274 . . . by R.
We often struggle with expressions of a pattern 1 − 1y , so we denote this function as
a(y) to abbreviate formulas.
The proof of Lemma 1.
PROOF. At first, we want to bound a lower tail of distribution P (Mn 6 dlog(n)e − 5).
Here we would like to find a sufficient upper limitation for the above probability. As-
sume that l 6 dlog(n)e − 5. Consider the probability that Mn has value l:
pn,l
Thm 2
6
l−1∑
j=0
2−
j(j−1)
2
(
1− 2−(l−j)
)n
rjrl−1−j 6 R2
(
1− 2−l)n l−1∑
j=0
√
2
−j+1
6 R2 2√
2− 1 exp(−n2
−l) = R2(2
√
2 + 2) exp(−n2−l).
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Remark that the above restraint is totally useless when l > log(n)− 2, so it cannot be
employed to obtain a reasonable bound for an symmetrical upper tail. Howewer, the
aforementioned formula will help us to limit the left tail of the distribution of Mn:
δ1 =
dlog(n)e−5∑
l=1
P (Mn = l) 6 R2(2
√
2 + 2)
dlog(n)e−5∑
l=1
exp(−n2−l)
6 R2(2
√
2 + 2)
∞∑
k=4
exp(−2k) 6 R2(2
√
2 + 2)
∞∑
k=1
exp(−16k)
= R2(2
√
2 + 2)
exp(−16)
1− exp(−16)
W
= 0.000006515315 . . . .

The proof of Lemma 2.
PROOF. Actual goal is to limit an upper tail, that is P (Mn > dlog(n)e+ 5). Consider
a process X = (Xk, k ∈ [0 : n]). Let X initially follow the incrementation rule
P (Xk = k + 1) = 1 for k ∈ [0 : dlog ne + 1]. Afterwards, let this Markov chain
imitate the transition rule of Morris Counter, that is
P (Xk+1 = m+ 1|Xk = m) = 1
2m
= 1− P (Xk+1 = m|Xk = m)
for k > dlog(n)e + 1. Naturally, for k 6 dlog(n)e + 1, we have Xk > Mk, so
we may couple realizations of these two processes in such a way that whenever X is
incremented, then so is M and if M does not change, then X does not rise as well
(note that X has at most the same probability of a positive incrementation as M at any
point of time).
To abbreviate the expressions let us denote m = n− dlog(n)e − 1 and
µc = P (Xk+1 = dlog(n)e+ c+ 1|Xk = dlog(n)e+ c) = 1
2dlog(n)e+c
= 1− νc ,
for any c ∈ Z. Moreover, let us define a three-dimensional discrete simplex:
S
(3)
k = {l¯ = (l1, l2, l3) ∈ N30 : l1 + l2 + l3 6 k} .
The coupling encountered above, ensures us that
δ2 6 P (Xn > dlog(n)e+ 5) =
∑
l¯∈S(3)m−3
νl12 µ2ν
l2
3 µ3ν
l3
4 µ4 6
∑
l¯∈S(3)m−3
1
23dlog(n)e+9
=
m−3∑
k=0
(
k + 3
2
)
1
23dlog(n)e+9
6 1
210n3
m∑
k=3
k2 − k .
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Realize that
m∑
k=3
k = 12 (m− 2)(m+ 3) and
m∑
k=3
k2 = 16 (m− 2)(2m2 + 7m+ 15), so
δ2 6
1
210n3
1
6
(m− 2)(2m2 + 4m+ 6) = 1
3 · 210n3 (m
3 −m− 6)
6 m
3
3 · 210n3 6
1
3 · 210 = 0.000325521 . . . .
Be awared that when m < 3 (that is, when n < 7), then the above sums are empty, but
on the other hand dlog(n)e+ 5 > n+ 1, so the inequality is trivially true. 
Next two lemmas are useful in a proof of Lemma 6:
Lemma 4. Let c > 1x . Then
a(2cx)2y > a(cx)y−1
(
a(cx) +
y
4c2x2
)
and
a(cx)y > a(2cx)2y−2
(
a(2cx)2 − y
4c2x2
)
.
PROOF.
a(2cx)2y − a(cx)y =
(
1− 1
cx
+
1
4c2x2
− 1 + 1
cx
) y−1∑
i=0
a(2cx)2ia(cx)y−i−1 .
Hence a(2cx)2y − a(cx)y > y4c2x2 a(cx)y−1
and a(2cx)2y − a(cx)y 6 y4c2x2 a(2cx)2(y−1), what imply the thesis of this Lemma. 
Lemma 5. Let s 6 log(x4 ). Then a(2−sx)2x+1 < e−2
s+1
and
a(2−sx)x−1 > e−2
s
(
1− 2
2s−1 − 2s
x
− 2
2s−7 + 24s−3
x2
)
.
PROOF. Let f1(x; s) := a(2−sx)2x+1
W
= e−2
s+1 (
1−O (x−1)) . Realize a simple
fact, that z ln(z) > z − 1 for 0 < z 6 1. Hence(
1− 2
s
x
)−2x
∂f1(x; s)
∂x
W
=
2s(2x+ 1)
x2
+ 2
(
1− 2
s
x
)
ln
(
1− 2
s
x
)
>
2s−1
x2
> 0
and in a consequence a(2−sx)2x+1 < e−2
s+1
for any reasonable s. Moreover, let
D(x; s) := 1− 2
2s−1 − 2s
x
− 2
2s−7 + 24s−3
x2
and
f2(x; s) :=
a(2−sx)x−1
D(x; s)
W
= e−2
s (
1 +O
(
x−2
))
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Then, in a similar way
D(x; s)2
(
1− 2
s
x
)−x+1
∂f2(x; s)
∂x
W
=
D(x; s)
(
2s(x− 1)
x2
(
1− 2sx
) + ln(1− 2s
x
))
−
(
22s−6 + 24s−2
x3
+
22s−1 − 2s
x2
)
<
(
22s−1 − 2s
x2
+
23s − 22s
x3
(
1− 2sx
) − 23s
3x3
)
−
(
22s−6 + 24s−2
x3
+
22s−1 − 2s
x2
)
=
23s − 22s
x3
(
1− 2sx
) − 23s
3x3
− 2
2s−6 + 24s−2
x3
.
Let d := 1− 2sx and realize that d ∈ [ 34 , 1) and 2s − 1 + d
(− 2s3 − 2−6 − 22s−2) > 0.
Indeed, if we put z = 2s, then we attain a quadratic inequality in z variable, with
determinant ∆ = 1− 5d3 + 55d
2
576 , that is negative for d ∈ [ 34 , 1).
Hence
∂f2(x; s)
∂x
< 0 and consequently
a(2−sx)x−1 > e−2
s
(
1− 2
2s−1 − 2s
x
− 2
2s−7 + 24s−3
x2
)
for any reasonable s. 
Lemma 6. a) Sequence (p2k+1,k+4)∞k=2 is descending.
b) Sequence (p2k+1,k+5)∞k=3 is ascending.
PROOF. Let x = 2k and t ∈ {0, 1}. In advance we define
κ(k, t) := (−1)k+4+t2− (k+4+t)(k+3+t)2 rk+4+t2−2x−1
and
τ(k, t) := 1(26 |(k + t))(−1)k+t+32− (k+t+3)(k+t+2)2 2rk+t+3
((
3
4
)2x+1
−
(
1
2
)x+2)
.
Realize that for t ∈ {0, 1} and k > 5, |τ(k, t) + κ(k, t)| < 2−50 < 10−15. Now,
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consider the differences between the consecutive elements of sequences:
p2k+1+1,k+5+t − p2k+1,k+4+t Thm 2= κ(k, t)+
+
k+3+t∑
i=0
(−1)i2− i(i−1)2 rirk+t+4−i
[(
1− 2
−5−t+i
x
)2x+1
−
(
1− 2
−4−t+i
x
)x+2]
=
b k+2+t2 c∑
i=0
{
2−i(2i−1)r2irk+t+4−2i
[
a(25+t−2ix)2x+1 − a(24+t−2ix)x+2]
− 2−(2i+1)ir2i+1rk+t+3−2i
[
a(24+t−2ix)2x+1 − a(23+t−2ix)x+2]}+ (τ + κ)(k, t)
=
b k+t+22 c∑
i=0
2−i(2i−1)r2i+1rk+t+4−2i
[
a(22i+1)
(
a(25+t−2ix)2x+1 − a(24+t−2ix)x+2)
− 2−2ia(24+t−2ix) (a(24+t−2ix)2x+1 − a(23+t−2ix)x+2)]+ τ(k, t) + κ(k, t) .
Let us define ut = 25+t−2i and
Wt(i) = a(2
2i+1)
(
a(utx)
2x+1 − a
(ut
2
x
)x+2)
− 2−2ia
(ut
2
x
)(
a
(ut
2
x
)2x+1
− a
(ut
4
x
)x+2)
and consider an upper bound of the last term:
Wt(i) 6a(22i+1)
(
a(utx)
2x+1 − a(utx)2x+2
(
a(utx)
2 − x+ 2
u2tx
2
))
−2−2i
(
a
(ut
4
x
)x(
a
(ut
4
x
)
+
x+ 1
u2t
4 x
2
)
− a
(ut
2
x
)
a
(ut
4
x
)x+2)
W
=a(22i+1)a(utx)
2x+1 1
x
(
3ut + 1
u2t
− ut + 1
u3tx
− 1
u3tx
2
)
−2−2ia
(ut
4
x
)x 1
x
(
6ut + 4
u2t
− 28
xu2t
+
32
x2u3t
)
.
Note that 2i 6 k+2+ t, so 8x 6 ut and in consequence 6ut− 28x > 20x > 0. Moreover
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ut(3ut + 1)− ut+1x − 1x2 > ut( 24x + 1)− ut+1x − 1x2 > 7x + 183x2 > 0. Hence
Wt(i) < a(2
2i+1)e−
2
ut
1
x
(
3ut + 1
u2t
− ut + 1
xu3t
− 1
x2u3t
)
− 2−2ia
(u
4
x
)
e−
4
utD(x; 2i− 3− t) 1
x
(
6ut + 4
u2t
− 28
xu2t
+
32
x2u3t
)
W
= a(22i+1)e−
2
ut
1
x
(
3ut + 1
u2t
− ut + 1
xu3t
− 1
x2u3t
)
− 2−2ie− 4ut 1
x
(
6ut + 4
u2t
− 32 + 48ut + 28u
2
t
u4tx
− 128 + 64ut −
703
2 u
2
t +
259
4 u
3
t
u6tx
2
+
512 + 128ut − 1150u2t + 9092 u3t
u7tx
3
− 4608− 1024ut + 530u
2
t
u7tx
4
+
4096 + 16u2t
u8tx
5
)
Denote the above latter upper bound of Wt(i) by Ut(x;ut(i)).
Analogically we would like to establish a lower bound of Wt(i):
Wt(i) >a(22i+1)
(
a(utx)a
(ut
2
x
)x−1(
a
(ut
2
x
)
+
1
u2tx
)
− a
(ut
2
x
)x+2)
−2−2ia
(ut
2
x
)(
a
(ut
2
x
)2x+1
− a
(ut
2
x
)2x+2(
a
(ut
2
x
)2
− x+ 2
u2t
4 x
2
))
W
=a(22i+1)a
(ut
2
x
)x−1 1
x
(
3ut + 1
u2t
− 10ut + 1
u3tx
+
8
u3tx
2
)
(A.1)
−2−2ia
(ut
2
x
)2x+2 1
x
(
6ut + 4
u2t
− 4ut + 8
u3tx
− 8
u3tx
2
)
Now from 8x 6 ut we attain
ut(3ut + 1)− 10ut + 1
x
= ut
(
7ut
4
+
7
8
)
+ (10ut + 1)
(
ut
8
− 1
x
)
> ut
(
7ut
4
+
7
8
)
> 0 (A.2)
and ut(6ut + 4)− 4ut+8x − 8x2 > 48utx + 32x − 4ut+8x − 8x2 > 24x + 344x2 > 0. Hence
Wt(i) > a(2
2i+1)e−
2
utD(x; 2i− 4− t) 1
x
(
3ut + 1
u2t
− 10ut + 1
u3tx
+
8
u3tx
2
)
− 2−2ie− 4ut a
(ut
2
x
) 1
x
(
6ut + 4
u2t
− 4ut + 8
u3tx
− 8
u3tx
2
)
W
= a(22i+1)e−
2
ut
1
x
(
3ut + 1
u2t
− 2 + 5ut + 4u
2
t
u4tx
− 2 + 4ut −
575
32 u
2
t +
387
32 u
3
t
u6tx
2
+
2 + 20ut − 51132 u2t + 26116 u3t
u7tx
3
− 16 +
1
4u
2
t
u7tx
4
)
− 2−2ie− 4ut 1
x
(
6ut + 4
u2t
− 16ut + 16
u3tx
+
16
u4tx
2
+
16
u4tx
3
)
.
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Denote the latter lower bound forWt(i) by Lt(x;ut(i)). Now we show thatWt(i) > 0
for i > 1. Indeed, from Inequalities A.1 and A.2 we obtain
Wt(i) >
a
(
ut
2 x
)x
xu2t
(
a(22i+1)
14ut + 7
8
− 2−2i(6ut + 4)
)
(A.3)
If i > 2, then A.3 > 1256 (31(14ut + 7)− 96ut − 64) > 0.
In the last case, when i = 1, then ut > 8, so A.3 > 164 (7(14ut + 7)− 96ut − 64) =
2ut−15
64 >
1
64 .
Thanks to the propertyWt(i) > 0 for i > 1, we may subtly neutralize the influence
of rk+5−i in the considered sum:
b k+22 c∑
i=0
2−i(2i−1)r2i+1rk+5−iW0(i) < rk+5
b k+22 c∑
i=0
2−i(2i−1)r2i+1W0(i) .
Naturally we may consider U0(x;u0(i)) instead of W0(i) numerically for i 6 4:
4∑
i=0
2−i(2i−1)r2i+1U0(x;u0(i))
W
= −8.294491525704523 · 10−6 + 0.15588
x
+
0.00407163
x2
− 0.0298032
x3
+
0.0198815
x4
− 0.00785419
x5
,
so for x > 215 (k > 15),
4∑
i=0
2−i(2i−1)r2i+1W0(i) 6 −3.53741 · 10−6. Moreover we
may bound W0(i) by a(25−2ix)2x+1 for the rest of the sum:
b k+22 c∑
i=5
2−i(2i−1)r2i+1a(25−2ix)2x+1 6
R 2−45e−64
1− 2−21e−192
W
= 1.5784 . . . · 10−41 ,
so p2k+1+1,k+5 − p2k+1,k+4 < 0 for k > 15.
However, according to Theorem 2, we also present the numerical values of the se-
quence (p2k+1,k+4)14k=2 in the Table A.2. We can now easily see that for any k > 2 we
attained p2k+1+1,k+5 − p2k+1,k+4 < 0 .
k p2k+1,k+4 k p2k+1,k+4 k p2k+1,k+4
2 0.0000305176 . . . 7 0.0000189841 . . . 12 0.0000185484 . . .
3 0.0000256707 . . . 8 0.000018759 . . . 13 0.0000185413 . . .
4 0.0000221583 . . . 9 0.0000186466 . . . 14 0.0000185378 . . .
5 0.0000203424 . . . 10 0.0000185904 . . .
6 0.0000194356 . . . 11 0.0000185624 . . .
Table A.2: Numerical values of the sequence (p2k+1,k+4)
14
k=2.
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Moreover, realize that rk+5rk+3 < 1.1 for any k > 3, so
1∑
i=0
2−i(2i−1)r2i+11.11−iL1(x;u1(i))
W
= 0.00128843 . . .+
0.00212699 . . .
x
−0.00326251 . . .
x2
+
0.000219133
x3
− 3.50924875 . . . · 10
−7
x4
For any possible x > 8 (k > 3),
∑1
i=0 2
−i(2i−1)r2i+11.11−iL1(x;ut(i)) > 0.0015.
We already know that W1(i) are positive for i > 1, so p2k+1+1,k+6 − p2k+1,k+5 > 0
for all k > 3. 
We may use Theorem 2 once again to see that
p26+1,10
p26+1,11
W
= 129.454 > 27 and
p27+1,11
p27+1,12
W
=
125.065 < 27. Together with Lemma 6 we may easily attain Claim 1 and we instantly
see that this Claim cannot be extended continously for k < 7.
Lemma 7. Let 2 6 l 6 n and assume that pn,l−i = 22−iαipn,l−i+1 for i ∈ [0 : 2]
and pn+1,l−j = 22−jα′jpn+1,l−j+1 for j ∈ [0 : 1].
If 0 6 α2 < α1 < α0, then 0 < α′1 < α′0.
PROOF. Realize that pn+1,l−i+1 = pn,l−i+1(1− 2−l+i−1 + 2−l+2αi) for i ∈ [0 : 2],
so for j ∈ [0 : 1],
α′j =
pn+1,l−j
22−jpn+1,l−j+1
=
pn,l−j(1− 2−l+j + 2−l+2αj+1)
22−jpn,l−j+1(1− 2−l+j−1 + 2−l+2αj)
=
αj(1− 2−l+j + 2−l+2αj+1)
1− 2−l+j−1 + 2−l+2αj .
Assume that α′1 > α′0. Then
L := α1(1−2−l+1+2−l+2α2)(1−2−l−1+2−l+2α0) > α0(1−2−l+2−l+2α1)2 =: R.
However, contrary to the assumption,
L = α1(1− 2−l+1 + 2−2l − 2−l−1 + 2−l+2(α0 + α2)− 2−2l+3α0
− 2−2l+1α2 + 2−2l+4α0α2)
< α0(1− 2−l+1 + 2−2l) + α1(2−l+2(2α0) + 2−2l+4α0α1)
< α0(1− 2−l+1 + 2−2l + α1(2−l+3 + 2−2l+3 + 2−2l+4α1)) = R .

Lemma 8. If for some n ∈ N, pn,n = 2nηnpn,n+1 and
pn+1,n+1 = 2
n+1ηn+1pn+1,n+2, then ηn < ηn+1.
PROOF.
0 = pn+1,n+1 − 2n+1ηn+1pn+1,n+2 = pn,n+1(1− 2−n−1) + pn,n2−n
− ηn+1pn,n+1 = pn,n+1(1− 2−n−1 + ηn − ηn+1) ,
but 1− 2−n−1 > 0, so ηn < ηn+1. 
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